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Discussions about the possible consequences of creating superintelligence have included the possibility 
of existential risk, often understood mainly as the risk of human extinction. We argue that suffering risks 
(s-risks), where an adverse outcome would bring about severe suffering on an astronomical scale, are 
risks of a comparable severity and probability as risks of extinction. Preventing them is the common 
interest of many different value systems. Furthermore, we argue that in the same way as superintelligent 
AI both contributes to existential risk but can also help prevent it, superintelligent AI can be both the 
cause of suffering risks and a way to prevent them from being realized. Some types of work aimed at 
making superintelligent AI safe will also help prevent suffering risks, and there may also be a class of 
safeguards for AI that helps specifically against s-risks. 
Povzetek: Prispevek analizira prednosti in nevarnosti superinteligence.  
 
1 Introduction 
Work discussing the possible consequences of creating 
superintelligent AI (Yudkowsky 2008, Bostrom 2014, 
Sotala & Yampolskiy 2015) has discussed 
superintelligence as a possible existential risk: a risk 
"where an adverse outcome would either annihilate 
Earth-originating intelligent life or permanently and 
drastically curtail its potential" (Bostrom 2002, 2013). 
The previous work has mostly1 considered the worst-
case outcome to be the possibility of human extinction by 
an AI that is indifferent to humanity’s survival and 
values. However, it is often thought that for an 
individual, there exist “fates worse than death”; 
analogously, for civilizations there may exist fates worse 
than extinction, such as survival in conditions in which 
most people will experience enormous suffering for most 
of their lives. 
Even if such extreme outcomes would be avoided, 
the known universe may eventually be populated by vast 
amounts of minds: published estimates include the 
possibility of 1025 minds supported by a single star 
(Bostrom 2003a), with humanity having the potential to 
eventually colonize tens of millions of galaxies 
(Armstrong & Sandberg 2013). While this could enable 
an enormous number of meaningful lives to be lived, if 
even a small fraction of these lives were to exist in 
hellish circumstances, the amount of suffering would be 
vastly greater than that produced by all the atrocities, 
abuses, and natural causes in Earth’s history so far. 
                                                          
1 Bostrom (2014) is mainly focused on the risk of 
extinction, but does also devote some discussion to 
alternative negative outcomes such as “mindcrime”. We 
discuss mindcrime in section 5. 
We term the possibility of such outcomes a suffering 
risk: 
Suffering risk (s-risk): One where an adverse 
outcome would bring about severe suffering on 
an astronomical scale, vastly exceeding all 
suffering that has existed on Earth so far. 
In order for potential risks - including s-risks - to 
merit work on them, three conditions must be met. First, 
the outcome of the risk must be sufficiently severe to 
merit attention. Second, the risk must have some 
reasonable probability of being realized. Third, there 
must be some way for risk-avoidance work to reduce 
either the probability or severity of an adverse outcome. 
In this paper, we will argue that suffering risks meet 
all three criteria, and that s-risk avoidance work is thus of 
a comparable magnitude in importance as work on risks 
from extinction. Section 2 seeks to establish the severity 
of s-risks. There, we will argue that there are classes of 
suffering-related adverse outcomes that many value 
systems would consider to be equally or even more 
severe than extinction. Additionally, we will define a 
class of less severe suffering outcomes which many 
value systems would consider important to avoid, albeit 
not as important as avoiding extinction. Section 3 looks 
at suffering risks from the view of several different value 
systems, and discusses how much they would prioritize 
avoiding different suffering outcomes. Next, we will 
argue that there is a reasonable probability for a number 
of different suffering risks to be realized. Our discussion 
is organized according to the relationship that 
superintelligent AIs have to suffering risks: section 4 
covers risks that may be prevented by a 
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superintelligence, and section 5 covers risks that may be 
realized by one2. Section 6 discusses how it might be 
possible to work on suffering risks. 
2 Suffering risks as risks of extreme 
severity 
As already noted, the main focus in discussion of risks 
from superintelligent AI has been either literal extinction, 
with the AI killing humans as a side-effect of pursuing 
some other goal (Yudkowsky 2008), or a value 
extinction. In value extinction, some form of humanity 
may survive, but the future is controlled by an AI 
operating according to values which all current-day 
humans would consider worthless (Yudkowsky 2011). In 
either scenario, it is thought that the resulting future 
would have no value. 
In this section, we will argue that besides futures that 
have no value, according to many different value systems 
it is possible to have futures with negative value. These 
would count as the worst category of existential risks. In 
addition, there are adverse outcomes of a lesser severity, 
which depending on one’s value systems may not 
necessarily count as worse than extinction. Regardless, 
making these outcomes less likely is a high priority and a 
common interest of many different value systems. 
Bostrom (2002) frames his definition of extinction 
risks with a discussion which characterizes a single 
person’s death as being a risk of terminal intensity and 
personal scope, with existential risks being risks of 
terminal intensity and global scope - one person’s death 
versus the death of all humans. However, it is commonly 
thought that there are “fates worse than death”: at one 
extreme, being tortured for an extended time (with no 
chance of rescue), and then killed.  
As less extreme examples, various negative health 
conditions are often considered worse than death (Rubin, 
Buehler & Halpern 2016; Sayah et al. 2015; Ditto et al., 
1996): for example, among hospitalized patients with 
severe illness, a majority of respondents considered 
bowel and bladder incontinence, relying on a feeding 
tube to live, and being unable to get up from bed, to be 
conditions that were worse than death (Rubin, Buehler & 
Halpern 2016). While these are prospective evaluations 
rather than what people have actually experienced, 
several countries have laws allowing for voluntary 
euthanasia, which people with various adverse conditions 
have chosen rather than go on living. This may 
considered an empirical confirmation of some states of 
life being worse than death, at least as judged by the 
people who choose to die. 
The notion of fates worse than death suggests the 
existence of a “hellish” severity that is one step worse 
than “terminal”, and which might affect civilizations as 
                                                          
2 Superintelligent AIs being in a special position where 
they might either enable or prevent suffering risks, is 
similar to the way in which they are in a special position 
to make risks of extinction both more or less likely 
(Yudkowsky 2008). 
well as individuals. Bostrom (2013) seems to 
acknowledge this by including “hellish” as a possible 
severity in the corresponding chart, but does not place 
any concrete outcomes under the hellish severity, 
implying that risks of extinction are still the worst 
outcomes. Yet there seem to be plausible paths to 
civilization-wide hell outcomes as well (Figure 1), which 
we will discuss in sections 4 and 5.   







Personal Car is stolen Death Extended torture 
followed by 
death 
 Endurable Terminal Hellish 
Figure 1: The worst suffering risks are ones that affect 
everyone and subject people to hellish conditions. 
In order to qualify as equally bad or worse than 
extinction, suffering risks do not necessarily need to 
affect every single member of humanity. For example, 
consider a simplified ethical calculus where someone 
may have a predominantly happy life (+1), never exist 
(0), or have a predominantly unhappy life (-1). As long 
as the people having predominantly unhappy lives 
outnumber the people having predominantly happy lives, 
under this calculus such an outcome would be considered 
worse than nobody existing in the first place. We will 
call this scenario a net suffering outcome3. 
This outcome might be considered justifiable if we 
assumed that, given enough time, the people living happy 
lives will eventually outnumber the people living 
unhappy lives. Most value systems would then still 
consider a net suffering outcome worth avoiding, but 
they might consider it an acceptable cost for an even 
larger amount of future happy lives. 
On the other hand it is also possible that the world 
could become locked into conditions in which the 
balance would remain negative even when considering 
all the lives that will ever live: things would never get 
better. We will call this a pan-generational net 
suffering outcome. 
In addition to net and pan-generational net suffering 
outcomes, we will consider a third category. In these 
outcomes, serious suffering may be limited to only a 
fraction of the population, but the overall population at 
some given time4 is still large enough that even this small 
fraction accounts for many times more suffering than has 
                                                          
3 “Net” should be considered equivalent to Bostrom’s 
“global”, but we have chosen a different name to avoid 
giving the impression that the outcome would necessarily 
be limited to only one planet. 
4 One could also consider the category of pan-
generational astronomical suffering outcomes, but 
restricting ourselves into just three categories is sufficient 
for our current discussion. 
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existed in the history of the Earth. We will call these 
astronomical suffering outcomes. 




At some point in time, a fraction of the 
population experiences hellish suffering, enough 
to overall constitute an astronomical amount that 
overwhelms all the suffering in Earth’s history. 
Net suffering 
outcome 
At some point in time, there are more people 
experiencing lives filled predominantly with 
suffering than there are people experiencing lives 





When summed over all the people that will ever 
live, there are more people experiencing lives 
filled predominantly with suffering than there are 
people experiencing lives filled predominantly 
with happiness. 
Figure 2: types of possible suffering outcomes. An 
outcome may count as one or several of the categories in 
this table. 
Any value system which puts weight on preventing 
suffering implies at least some interest in preventing 
suffering risks. Additionally, as we will discuss below, 
even value systems which do not care about suffering 
directly may still have an interest in preventing suffering 
risks. 
We expect these claims to be relatively 
uncontroversial. A more complicated question is that of 
tradeoffs: what should one do if some interventions 
increase the risk of extinction but make suffering risks 
less likely, or vice versa? As we will discuss below, if 
forced to choose between these two, different value 
systems will differ in which of the interventions they 
favor. In such a case, rather than to risk conflict between 
value systems, a better alternative would be to attempt to 
identify interventions which do not involve such a 
tradeoff. If there were interventions that reduced the risk 
of extinction without increasing the risk of astronomical 
suffering, or decreased the risk of astronomical suffering 
without increasing the risk of extinction, or decreased 
both, then it would be in everyone’s interest to agree to 
jointly focus on these three classes of interventions. 
3 Suffering risks from the 
perspective of different value 
systems 
We will now take a brief look at different value systems 
and their stance on suffering risks, as well as their stance 
on the related tradeoffs. 
Classical utilitarianism. All else being equal, 
classical utilitarians would prefer a universe in which 
there were many happy lives and no suffering. However, 
a noteworthy feature about classical utilitarianism (as 
well as some other aggregative theories) is that it 
considers very good and very bad scenarios to be 
symmetrical - that is, a scenario with 10^20 humans 
living happy lives may be considered equally good, as a 
scenario with 10^20 humans living miserable lives is 
considered bad.  
Thus, people following classical utilitarianism or 
some other aggregative theory may find compelling the 
argument (Bostrom 2003a) that an uncolonized universe 
represents a massive waste of potential value, and be 
willing to risk - or even accept - astronomical numbers of 
suffering individuals if that was an unavoidable cost to 
creating even larger numbers of happiness. Thus, 
classical utilitarianism would consider astronomical and 
net suffering outcomes something to avoid but possibly 
acceptable, and pan-generational net suffering outcomes 
as something to avoid under all circumstances. 
Other aggregative theories. Any moral theory which 
was not explicitly utilitarian, but still had an aggregative 
component that disvalued suffering, would consider 
suffering risks as something to avoid. Additionally, for 
moral theories that valued things other than just pleasure 
and suffering - such as preference satisfaction, some 
broader notion of “human flourishing”, objective list 
theories - hellscape scenarios would likely also threaten 
the satisfaction of many of the things that these theories 
valued. For example, minds experiencing enormous 
suffering are probably not flourishing, are likely to have 
unsatisfied preferences, and probably do not have many 
of the things considered valuable in objective list 
theories.  
Similarly to classical utilitarianism, many 
aggregative theories could be willing to risk or even 
accept astronomical and civilization-wide suffering 
outcomes as a necessary evil but wish to avoid pan-
generational net suffering outcomes. At the same time, 
many aggregative theories might incorporate some 
suffering-focused intuition (discussed below) which 
caused them to put more weight on the avoidance of 
suffering than the creation of other valuable things. 
Depending on the circumstances, this might cause them 
to reject the kind of reasoning which suggested that 
suffering outcomes could be an acceptable cost. 
Rights-based theories. Rights-based theories would 
consider suffering risks a bad thing directly to the extent 
that they held that people - or animals (Regan 1980) - 
had a right to be treated well avoid unnecessary 
suffering. They could also consider suffering risks 
indirectly bad, if the suffering was caused by conditions 
which violated some other right or severely constrained 
someone’s capabilities (Nussbaum 1997, p. 287). For 
example, a right to meaningful autonomy could be 
violated if a mind was subjected to enormous suffering 
and had no meaningful option to escape it.  
General suffering-focused intuitions. There are 
various moral views and principles which could fit many 
different value systems, all of which would imply that 
suffering risks were something important to avoid and 
which might cause one to weigh the avoidance of 
suffering more strongly than the creation of happiness: 
1. Prioritarianism. Prioritarianism is the position that 
the worse off an individual is, the more morally valuable 
it is to make that individual better off (Parfit 1991). That 
is, if one person is living in hellish conditions and 
another is well-off, then making the former person 
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slightly better off is more valuable than improving the 
life of the well-off person by the same amount. A stance 
of “astronomical prioritarianism” that considers all minds 
across the universe, and prioritizes improving the worst 
ones sufficiently strongly, pushes in the direction of 
mainly improving the lives of those that would be worst 
off and thus avoiding suffering risks. If a suffering 
outcome does manifest itself, prioritarianism would 
prioritize bringing it to an end, over creating additional 
well-off lives or further helping those who are already 
well off. Prioritarianism may imply focusing particularly 
on risks from future technologies, as these may enable 
the creation of mind states that are worse than the current 
biopsychological limits.  
Besides prioritarianism, the following three 
intuitions (Gloor & Mannino 2016) would also prioritize 
the avoidance of suffering risks5: 
2. Making people happy, not happy people6. An 
intuition which is present in preference-based views such 
as antifrustrationism (Fehige 1998), antinatalism 
(Benatar 2008), as well as the “moral ledger” analogy 
(Singer 1993) and prior-existence utilitarianism (Singer 
1993), is that it is more important to make existing 
people better off than it is to create new happy beings.7 
For example, given the choice between helping a million 
currently-existing people who are in pain and bringing 
ten million new people into existence, this view holds 
that it is more important to help the existing people, even 
if the ten million new people would end up living happy 
lives. 
A part of this view is the notion that it is not 
intrinsically bad to never be created, whereas it is 
intrinsically bad to exist and be badly off, or to be killed 
against one’s wishes once one does exist. If one accepts 
this position, then one could still want to avoid extinction 
- or at least the death of currently-living humans - but the 
promise of astronomical numbers of happy lives being 
created (Bostrom 2003a) would not be seen as 
particularly compelling, whereas the possible creation of 
                                                          
5 One might naturally also have various intuitions that 
point in the opposite direction, that is, of not prioritizing 
suffering risks. We will not survey these, as our intent in 
this section is merely to establish that many would 
consider suffering risks as important to avoid, without 
claiming that this would be the only plausible view to 
hold. 
6 The name of this intuition is a paraphrase of Narveson 
(1973), “We are in favor of making people happy, but 
neutral about making happy people.” 
7 Moral views that attempt to incorporate this intuition by 
treating the creation of new people as morally neutral 
(e.g. Singer’s “prior-existence” criterion) suffer from 
what Greaves (2017) calls a “remarkabl[e] difficult[y] to 
formulate any remotely acceptable axiology that captures 
this idea of ‘neutrality’”. The views by Benatar and 
Fehige avoid this problem, but they imply a more 
extreme position where adding new lives is neutral only 
in a best-case scenario where they contain no suffering or 
frustrated preferences. 
astronomical numbers of lives experiencing suffering 
could be seen as a major thing to avoid. 
3. Torture-level suffering cannot be 
counterbalanced. This intuition is present in the 
widespread notion that minor pains cannot be aggregated 
to become worse than an instant of torture (Rachels 
1998), in threshold negative utilitarianism (Ord 2013), 
philosophical fictional works such as The Ones Who 
Walk Away From Omelas (LeGuin 1973), and it may 
contribute to the absolute prohibitions against torture in 
some deontological moralities. Pearce (1995) expresses a 
form of it when he writes, “No amount of happiness or 
fun enjoyed by some organisms can notionally justify the 
indescribable horrors of Auschwitz”. 
4. Happiness as the absence of suffering. A view 
which is present in Epicureanism as well as many non-
Western traditions, such as Buddhism, is that of 
happiness as the absence of suffering. Under this view, 
when we are not experiencing states of pleasure, we 
begin to crave pleasure, and this craving constitutes 
suffering. Gloor (2017) writes: 
Uncomfortable pressure in one’s shoes, thirst, 
hunger, headaches, boredom, itches, non-effortless work, 
worries, longing for better times. When our brain is 
flooded with pleasure, we temporarily become unaware 
of all the negative ingredients of our stream of 
consciousness, and they thus cease to exist. Pleasure is 
the typical way in which our minds experience temporary 
freedom from suffering. This may contribute to the view 
that pleasure is the symmetrical counterpart to suffering, 
and that pleasure is in itself valuable and important to 
bring about. However, there are also (contingently rare) 
mental states devoid of anything bothersome that are not 
commonly described as (intensely) pleasurable, examples 
being flow states or states of meditative tranquility. Felt 
from the inside, tranquility is perfect in that it is 
untroubled by any aversive components, untroubled by 
any cravings for more pleasure. Likewise, a state of flow 
as it may be experienced during stimulating work, when 
listening to music or when playing video games, where 
tasks are being completed on auto-pilot with time flying 
and us having a low sense of self, also has this same 
quality of being experienced as completely problem-free. 
Such states - let us call them states of contentment - may 
not commonly be described as (intensely) pleasurable, 
but following philosophical traditions in both Buddhism 
and Epicureanism, these states, too, deserve to be 
considered states of happiness. 
Under this view, happiness and pleasure are not 
intrinsically good, but rather instrumentally good in that 
pleasure takes our focus away from suffering and thus 
helps us avoid it. Creating additional happiness, then, has 
no intrinsic value if that creation does not help avoid 
suffering. 
4 Suffering outcomes that could be 
prevented by a superintelligence 
In the previous section, we argued that nearly all 
plausible value systems will want to avoid suffering risks 
and that for many value systems, suffering risks are some 
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of the worst possible outcomes and thus some of the 
most important to avoid. However, whether this also 
makes suffering risks the type of risk that is the most 
important to focus on, also depends on how probable 
suffering risks are. If they seem exceedingly unlikely, 
then there is little reason to care about them. 
In this and the next section, we will discuss reasons 
for believing that there are various suffering outcomes 
that might realize themselves. We begin by considering 
outcomes which occur naturally but could be prevented 
by a superintelligence. In the next section, we will 
consider suffering outcomes which could be caused by a 
superintelligence. 
A superintelligence could prevent almost any 
outcome if it established itself a singleton, "a world order 
in which there is a single decision-making agency at the 
highest level" (Bostrom 2005). Although a 
superintelligence is not the only way by which a 
singleton might be formed, alternative ways - such as a 
world government or convergent evolution leading 
everyone to adopt the same values and goals (Bostrom 
2005) - do not seem particularly likely to happen soon. 
Once a superintelligence had established itself as a 
singleton, depending on its values it might choose to take 
actions that prevented suffering outcomes from arising. 
4.1 Are suffering outcomes likely? 
Bostrom (2003a) argues that given a technologically 
mature civilization capable of space colonization on a 
massive scale, this civilization "would likely also have 
the ability to establish at least the minimally favorable 
conditions required for future lives to be worth living", 
and that it could thus be assumed that all of these lives 
would be worth living. Moreover, we can reasonably 
assume that outcomes which are optimized for everything 
that is valuable are more likely than outcomes optimized 
for things that are disvaluable. While people want the 
future to be valuable both for altruistic and self-oriented 
reasons, no one intrinsically wants things to go badly. 
However, Bostrom has himself later argued that 
technological advancement combined with evolutionary 
forces could "lead to the gradual elimination of all forms 
of being worth caring about" (Bostrom 2005), admitting 
the possibility that there could be technologically 
advanced civilizations with very little of anything that we 
would consider valuable. The technological potential to 
create a civilization that had positive value does not 
automatically translate to that potential being used, so a 
very advanced civilization could still be one of no value 
or even negative value. 
Examples of technology’s potential being unevenly 
applied can be found throughout history. Wealth remains 
unevenly distributed today, with an estimated 795 
million people suffering from hunger even as one third of 
all produced food goes to waste (World Food 
Programme, 2017). Technological advancement has 
helped prevent many sources of suffering, but it has also 
created new ones, such as factory-farming practices 
under which large numbers of animals are maltreated in 
ways which maximize their production: in 2012, the 
amount of animals slaughtered for food was estimated at 
68 billion worldwide (Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations 2012). Industrialization has also 
contributed to anthropogenic climate change, which may 
lead to considerable global destruction. Earlier in history, 
advances in seafaring enabled the transatlantic slave 
trade, with close to 12 million Africans being sent in 
ships to live in slavery (Manning 1992). 
Technological advancement does not automatically 
lead to positive results (Häggström 2016). Persson & 
Savulescu (2012) argue that human tendencies such as 
“the bias towards the near future, our numbness to the 
suffering of great numbers, and our weak sense of 
responsibility for our omissions and collective 
contributions”, which are a result of the environment 
humanity evolved in, are no longer sufficient for dealing 
with novel technological problems such as climate 
change and it becoming easier for small groups to cause 
widespread destruction. Supporting this case, Greene 
(2013) draws on research from moral psychology to 
argue that morality has evolved to enable mutual 
cooperation and collaboration within a select group 
(“us”), and to enable groups to fight off everyone else 
(“them”). Such an evolved morality is badly equipped to 
deal with collective action problems requiring global 
compromises, and also increases the risk of conflict and 
generally negative-sum dynamics as more different 
groups get in contact with each other. 
As an opposing perspective, West (2017) argues that 
while people are often willing to engage in cruelty if this 
is the easiest way of achieving their desires, they are 
generally “not evil, just lazy”. Practices such as factory 
farming are widespread not because of some deep-seated 
desire to cause suffering, but rather because they are the 
most efficient way of producing meat and other animal 
source foods. If technologies such as growing meat from 
cell cultures became more efficient than factory farming, 
then the desire for efficiency could lead to the 
elimination of suffering. Similarly, industrialization has 
reduced the demand for slaves and forced labor as 
machine labor has become more effective. At the same 
time, West acknowledges that this is not a knockdown 
argument against the possibility of massive future 
suffering, and that the desire for efficiency could still 
lead to suffering outcomes such as simulated game 
worlds filled with sentient non-player characters (see 
section on cruelty-enabling technologies below). 
Another argument against net suffering outcomes is 
offered by Shulman (2012), who discusses the possibility 
of civilizations spending some nontrivial fraction of their 
resources constructing computing matter that was 
optimized for producing maximum pleasure per unit of 
energy, or for producing maximum suffering per unit of 
energy. Shulman’s argument rests on the assumption that 
value and disvalue are symmetrical with regard to such 
optimized states. The amount of pleasure or suffering 
produced this way could come to dominate any 
hedonistic utilitarian calculus, and even a weak 
benevolent bias that led to there being more optimized 
pleasure than optimized suffering could tip the balance in 
favor of there being more total happiness. Shulman’s 
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argument thus suggests that net suffering outcomes could 
be unlikely unless a (non-compassionate) singleton 
ensures that no optimized happiness is created. However, 
the possibility of optimized suffering and the chance of 
e.g. civilizations intentionally creating it as a way of 
extorting agents that care about suffering reduction, also 
makes astronomical suffering outcomes more likely. 
4.2 Suffering outcome: dystopian scenarios 
created by non-value-aligned 
incentives. 
Bostrom (2005, 2014) discusses the possibility of 
technological development and evolutionary and 
competitive pressures leading to various scenarios where 
everything of value has been lost, and where the overall 
value of the world may even be negative. Considering 
the possibility of a world where most minds are brain 
uploads doing constant work, Bostrom (2014) points out 
that we cannot know for sure that happy minds are the 
most productive under all conditions: it could turn out 
that anxious or unhappy minds would be more 
productive. If this were the case, the resulting outcomes 
could be dystopian indeed: 
We seldom put forth full effort. When we do, it is 
sometimes painful. Imagine running on a treadmill at a 
steep incline—heart pounding, muscles aching, lungs 
gasping for air. A glance at the timer: your next break, 
which will also be your death, is due in 49 years, 3 
months, 20 days, 4 hours, 56 minutes, and 12 seconds. 
You wish you had not been born. (Bostrom 2014, p. 201) 
As Bostrom (2014) notes, this kind of a scenario is 
by no means inevitable; Hanson (2016) argues for a more 
optimistic outcome, where brain emulations still spend 
most of their time working, but are generally happy. But 
even Hanson’s argument depends on economic pressures 
and human well-being happening to coincide: absent 
such a happy coincidence, he offers no argument for 
believing that the future will indeed be a happy one. 
More generally, Alexander (2014) discusses 
examples such as tragedies of the commons, Malthusian 
traps, arms races, and races to the bottom as cases where 
people are forced to choose between sacrificing some of 
their values and getting outcompeted. Alexander also 
notes the existence of changes to the world that nearly 
everyone would agree to be net improvements - such as 
every country reducing its military by 50%, with the 
savings going to infrastructure - which nonetheless do 
not happen because nobody has the incentive to carry 
them out. As such, even if the prevention of various 
kinds of suffering outcomes would be in everyone’s 
interest, the world might nonetheless end up in them if 
the incentives are sufficiently badly aligned and new 
technologies enable their creation. 
An additional reason for why such dynamics might 
lead to various suffering outcomes is the so-called Anna 
Karenina principle (Diamond 1997, Zaneveld et al. 
2017), named after the opening line of Tolstoy’s novel 
Anna Karenina: "all happy families are all alike; each 
unhappy family is unhappy in its own way". The general 
form of the principle is that for a range of endeavors or 
processes, from animal domestication (Diamond 1997) to 
the stability of animal microbiomes (Zaneveld et al. 
2017), there are many different factors that all need to go 
right, with even a single mismatch being liable to cause 
failure. 
Within the domain of psychology, Baumeister et al. 
(2001) review a range of research areas to argue that 
“bad is stronger than good”: while sufficiently many 
good events can overcome the effects of bad experiences, 
bad experiences have a bigger effect on the mind than 
good ones do. The effect of positive changes to well-
being also tends to decline faster than the impact of 
negative changes: on average, people’s well-being 
suffers and never fully recovers from events such as 
disability, widowhood, and divorce, whereas the 
improved well-being that results from events such as 
marriage or a job change dissipates almost completely 
given enough time (Lyubomirsky 2010). 
To recap, various evolutionary and game-theoretical 
forces may push civilization in directions that are 
effectively random, random changes are likely to bad for 
the things that humans value, and the effects of bad 
events are likely to linger disproportionately on the 
human psyche. Putting these considerations together 
suggests (though does not guarantee) that freewheeling 
development could eventually come to produce massive 
amounts of suffering. 
A possible counter-argument is that people are often 
more happy than their conditions might suggest. For 
example, as a widely-reported finding, while the life 
satisfaction reported by people living in bad conditions in 
slums is lower than that of people living in more affluent 
conditions, it is still higher than one might intuitively 
expect, and the slum-dwellers report being satisfied with 
many aspects of their life (Biswas-Diener & Diener 
2001). In part, this is explained by fact that despite the 
poor conditions, people living in the slums still report 
many things that bring them pleasure: a mother who has 
lost two daughters reports getting joy from her surviving 
son, is glad that the son will soon receive a job at a 
bakery, and is glad about her marriage to her husband 
and feels that her daily prayer is important (Biswas-
Diener & Diener 2001). 
However, a proper evaluation of this research is 
complicated: “suffering” might be conceptualized as best 
corresponding to negative feelings, which are a separate 
component from cognitively evaluated life satisfaction 
(Lukas, Diener & Suh 1996), with the above slum-
dweller study focusing mainly on life satisfaction. In 
general, life satisfaction is associated with material 
prosperity, while positive and negative feelings are 
associated with psychological needs such as autonomy, 
respect, and the ability to be able count on others in an 
emergency (Diener et al. 2010). A proper review of the 
literature and an analysis of how to interpret the research 
in terms of suffering risks is beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
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4.3 Suffering outcome: cruelty-enabling 
technologies. 
Better technology may enable people to better engage in 
cruel and actively sadistic pursuits. While active sadism 
and desire to hurt others may be a relatively rare 
occurrence in contemporary society, public cruelty has 
been a form of entertainment in many societies, ranging 
from the Roman practice of involuntary gladiator fights 
to animal cruelty in the Middle Ages. Even in 
contemporary society, there are widespread sentiments 
that people such as criminals should be severely 
punished in ways which inflict considerable suffering 
(part of the Roman gladiators were convicted criminals).  
Contemporary society also contains various 
individuals who are motivated by the desire to hurt others 
(Torres 2016, 2017a, 2017b, chap 4.), even to the point 
of sacrificing their own lives in the process. For example, 
Eric Harris, one of the two shooters of the Columbine 
High School Massacre, wrote extensively about his 
desire to rape and torture people, fantasized about 
tricking women into thinking that they were safe so that 
he could then hurt them, and wanted the freedom to be 
able to kill and rape without consequences (Langman 
2015). While mass shooters tend to be lone individuals, 
there have existed more organized groups who seem to 
have given their members the liberty to act on similar 
motivations (Torres 2017a), such as the Aum Shinrikyo 
cult, where dissent or even just “impure thoughts” were 
punished by rituals amounting to torture and defectors 
"routinely kidnapped, tortured, imprisoned in cargo 
crates, subjected to electro shock, drugged in the Astral 
Hospital or killed outright" (Flannery 2016). 
While most contemporary societies reject the idea of 
cruelty as entertainment, civilizations could eventually 
emerge in which such practices were again acceptable. 
Assuming advanced technology, this could take the form 
of keeping criminals and other undesirables alive 
indefinitely while subjecting them to eternal torture8, 
slaves kept for the purpose of sadistic actions who could 
be healed of any damage inflicted to them (one fictional 
illustration of such a scenario recently received 
widespread popularity as the TV series Westworld)9, or 
even something like vast dystopian simulations of 
fantasy warfare inhabited by sentient “non-player 
characters”, to serve as the location of massive 
multiplayer online games which people may play in as 
super-powered “heroes”.  
Particularly in the latter scenarios, the amount of 
sentient minds in such conditions could be many times 
                                                          
8 Fictional depictions include Ellison (1967) and Ryding 
(no date); note that both stories contain very disturbing 
imagery. A third depiction was in the “White Christmas” 
episode of the TV series Black Mirror, which included a 
killer placed in solitary confinement for thousands of 
years while having to listen to a Christmas song on an 
endless loop. 
9 Another fictional depiction includes Gentle (2004); the 
warning for disturbing graphic imagery very much 
applies. 
larger than the civilization’s other population. In 
contemporary computer games, it is normal for the player 
to kill thousands of computer-controlled opponents 
during the game, suggesting that a large-scale game in 
which a sizeable part of the population participated might 
instantiate very large numbers of non-player characters 
per player, existing only to be hurt for the pleasure of the 
players. 
5 Suffering outcomes that may be 
caused by superintelligence10 
In the previous section, we discussed possible suffering 
outcomes that might be realized without a singleton that 
could prevent them from occurring, and suggested that an 
appropriately-programmed superintelligence is currently 
the most likely candidate for forming such a singleton. 
However, an inappropriately programmed 
superintelligence could also cause suffering outcomes; 
we will now turn to this topic. 
Superintelligence is related to three categories of 
suffering risk: suffering subroutines (Tomasik 2017), 
mind crime (Bostrom 2014) and flawed realization 
(Bostrom 2013). 
5.1 Suffering subroutines 
Humans have evolved to be capable of suffering, and 
while the question of which other animals are conscious 
or capable of suffering is controversial, pain analogues 
are present in a wide variety of animals. The U.S. 
National Research Council’s Committee on Recognition 
and Alleviation of Pain in Laboratory Animals (2004) 
argues that, based on the state of existing evidence, at 
least all vertebrates should be considered capable of 
experiencing pain. 
Pain seems to have evolved because it has a 
functional purpose in guiding behavior: evolution having 
found it suggests that pain might be the simplest solution 
for achieving its purpose. A superintelligence which was 
building subagents, such as worker robots or 
disembodied cognitive agents, might then also construct 
them in such a way that they were capable of feeling pain 
- and thus possibly suffering (Metzinger 2015) - if that 
was the most efficient way of making them behave in a 
way that achieved the superintelligence’s goals. 
Humans have also evolved to experience empathy 
towards each other, but the evolutionary reasons which 
cause humans to have empathy (Singer 1981) may not be 
relevant for a superintelligent singleton which had no 
game-theoretical reason to empathize with others. In 
such a case, a superintelligence which had no 
disincentive to create suffering but did have an incentive 
to create whatever furthered its goals, could create vast 
populations of agents which sometimes suffered while 
carrying out the superintelligence’s goals. Because of the 
ruling superintelligence’s indifference towards suffering, 
                                                          
10 This section reprints material that has previously 
appeared in a work by one of the authors (Gloor 2016), 
but has not been formally published before. 
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the amount of suffering experienced by this population 
could be vastly higher than it would be in e.g. an 
advanced human civilization, where humans had an 
interest in helping out their fellow humans. 
Depending on the functional purpose of positive 
mental states such as happiness, the subagents might or 
might not be built to experience them. For example, 
Fredrickson (1998) suggests that positive and negative 
emotions have differing functions. Negative emotions 
bias an individual’s thoughts and actions towards some 
relatively specific response that has been evolutionarily 
adaptive: fear causes an urge to escape, anger causes an 
urge to attack, disgust an urge to be rid of the disgusting 
thing, and so on. In contrast, positive emotions bias 
thought-action tendencies in a much less specific 
direction. For example, joy creates an urge to play and be 
playful, but “play” includes a very wide range of 
behaviors, including physical, social, intellectual, and 
artistic play. All of these behaviors have the effect of 
developing the individual’s skills in whatever the 
domain. The overall effect of experiencing positive 
emotions is to build an individual’s resources - be those 
resources physical, intellectual, or social. 
To the extent that this hypothesis were true, a 
superintelligence might design its subagents in such a 
way that they had pre-determined response patterns for 
undesirable situations, so exhibited negative emotions. 
However, if it was constructing a kind of a command 
economy in which it desired to remain in control, it 
might not put a high value on any subagent accumulating 
individual resources. Intellectual resources would be 
valued to the extent that they contributed to the subagent 
doing its job, but physical and social resources could be 
irrelevant, if the subagents were provided with whatever 
resources necessary for doing their tasks. In such a case, 
the end result could be a world whose inhabitants 
experienced very little if any in the way of positive 
emotions, but did experience negative emotions. This 
could qualify as any one of the suffering outcomes we’ve 
considered (astronomical, net, pan-generational net). 
A major question mark with regard to suffering 
subroutines are the requirements for consciousness 
(Muehlhauser 2017) and suffering (Metzinger 2016, 
Tomasik 2017). The simpler the algorithms that can 
suffer, the more likely it is that an entity with no regard 
for minimizing it would happen to instantiate large 
numbers of them. If suffering has narrow requirements 
such as a specific kind of self-model (Metzinger 2016), 
then suffering subroutines may become less common. 
Below are some pathways that could lead to the 
instantiation of large numbers of suffering subroutines 
(Gloor 2016): 
Anthropocentrism. If the superintelligence had been 
programmed to only care about humans, or by minds 
which were sufficiently human-like by some criteria, 
then it could end up being indifferent to the suffering of 
any other minds, including subroutines. 
Indifference. If attempts to align the 
superintelligence with human values failed, it might not 
put any intrinsic value on avoiding suffering, so it may 
create large numbers of suffering subroutines. 
Uncooperativeness. The superintelligence’s goal is 
something like classical utilitarianism, with no additional 
regards for cooperating with other value systems. As 
previously discussed, classical utilitarianism would 
prefer to avoid suffering, all else being equal. However, 
this concern could be overridden by opportunity costs. 
For example, Bostrom (2003a) suggests that every 
second of delayed space colonization corresponds to a 
loss equal to 10^14 potential lives. A classical utilitarian 
superintelligence that took this estimate literally might 
choose to build colonization robots that used suffering 
subroutines, if this was the easiest way and developing 
alternative cognitive architectures capable of doing the 
job would take more time. 
5.2 Mind crime 
A superintelligence might run simulations of sentient 
beings for a variety of purposes. Bostrom (2014, p. 152) 
discusses the specific possibility of an AI creating 
simulations of human beings which were detailed enough 
to be conscious. These simulations could then be placed 
in a variety of situations in order to study things such as 
human psychology and sociology, and destroyed 
afterwards.  
The AI could also run simulations that modeled the 
evolutionary history of life on Earth, to obtain various 
kinds of scientific information or to help estimate the 
likely location of the “Great Filter” (Hanson 1998) and 
whether it should expect to encounter other intelligent 
civilizations. This could repeat the wild-animal suffering 
(Tomasik 2015, Dorado 2015) experienced in Earth’s 
evolutionary history. The AI could also create and 
mistreat, or threaten to mistreat, various minds as a way 
to blackmail other agents.  
As it is possible that minds in simulations could one 
day compose the majority of all existing minds (Bostrom 
2003b), and that with sufficient technology there could 
be astronomical numbers of them, then depending on the 
nature of the simulations and the net amount of happiness 
and suffering, mind crime could possibly lead to any one 
of the three suffering outcomes. 
Below are some pathways that could lead to mind 
crime (Gloor 2016): 
Anthropocentrism. Again, if the superintelligence 
had been programmed to only care about humans, or 
about minds which were sufficiently human-like by some 
criteria, then it could be indifferent to the suffering 
experienced by non-humans in its simulations. 
Indifference. If attempts to align the 
superintelligence with human values failed, it might not 
put any intrinsic value on avoiding suffering, so it may 
create large numbers of simulations with sentient minds 
if that furthered its objectives. 
Extortion. The superintelligence comes into conflict 
with another actor that disvalues suffering, so the 
superintelligence instantiates large numbers of suffering 
minds as a way of extorting the other entity. 
Libertarianism regarding computations: the creators 
of the first superintelligence instruct the AI to give every 
human alive at the time control of a planet or galaxy, 
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with no additional rules to govern what goes on within 
those territories. This would practically guarantee that 
some humans would use this opportunity for inflicting 
widespread cruelty (see the previous section). 
5.3 Flawed realization 
A superintelligence with human-aligned values might 
aim to convert the resources in its reach into clusters of 
utopia, and seek to colonize the universe in order to 
maximize the value of the world (Bostrom 2003a), filling 
the universe with new minds and valuable experiences 
and resources. At the same time, if the superintelligence 
had the wrong goals, this could result in a universe filled 
by vast amounts of disvalue. 
While some mistakes in value loading may result in 
a superintelligence whose goal is completely unlike what 
people value, certain mistakes could result in flawed 
realization (Bostrom 2013). In this outcome, the 
superintelligence’s goal gets human values mostly right, 
in the sense of sharing many similarities with what we 
value, but also contains a flaw that drastically changes 
the intended outcome11.  
For example, value extrapolation (Yudkowsky 2004) 
and value learning (Soares 2016, Sotala 2016) 
approaches attempt to learn human values in order to 
create a world that is in accordance with those values. 
There have been occasions in history when 
circumstances that cause suffering have been defended 
by appealing to values which seem pointless to modern 
sensibilities, but which were nonetheless a part of the 
prevailing values at the time. In Victorian London, the 
use of anesthesia in childbirth was opposed on the 
grounds that being under the partial influence of 
anesthetics may cause “improper” and “lascivious” 
sexual dreams (Farr 1980), with this being considered 
more important to avoid than the pain of childbirth. 
A flawed value-loading process might give 
disproportionate weight to historical, existing, or 
incorrectly extrapolated future values whose realization 
then becomes more important than the avoidance of 
suffering. Besides merely considering the avoidance of 
suffering less important than the enabling of other values, 
a flawed process might also tap into various human 
tendencies for endorsing or celebrating cruelty (see the 
discussion in section 4), or outright glorifying suffering. 
Small changes to a recipe for utopia may lead to a future 
with much more suffering than one shaped by a 
superintelligence whose goals were completely different 
from ours. 
6 How and whether to work on s-
risk? 
In the previous sections, we have argued for s-risks being 
severe enough to be worth preventing, and for there to be 
several plausible routes by which they might be realized. 
                                                          
11 One fictional illustration of a flawed utopia is 
Yudkowsky (2009), though this setting does not seem to 
contain enormous amounts of suffering. 
We will now argue for the case that it is possible to 
productively work on them today, via some of the 
following recommendations. 
Carry out general AI alignment work. Given that it 
would generally be against the values of most humans for 
suffering outcomes to be realized, research aimed at 
aligning AIs with human values (Yudkowsky 2008, 
Goertzel & Pitt 2012, Bostrom 2014, Sotala 2016, Soares 
& Fallenstein 2017) seems likely to also reduce the risk 
of suffering outcomes. If our argument for suffering 
outcomes being something to avoid is correct, then an 
aligned superintelligence should also attempt to establish 
a singleton that would prevent negative suffering 
outcomes, as well as avoiding the creation of suffering 
subroutines and mind crime.  
In addition to technical approaches to AI alignment, 
the possibility of suffering risks also tends to make more 
similar recommendations regarding social and political 
approaches. For example, Bostrom et al. (2016) note that 
conditions of global turbulence might cause challenges 
for creating value-aligned AI, such as if pre-existing 
agreement are not kept to and ill-conceived regulation is 
enacted in a haste. Previous work has also pointed to the 
danger of arms races making it harder to keep AI aligned 
(Shulman 2009, Miller 2012, Armstrong et al. 2013). As 
the avoidance of suffering outcomes is the joint interest 
of many different value systems, measures that reduce 
the risk of arms races and improve the ability of different 
value systems to shape the world in their desired 
direction can also help avoid suffering outcomes. 
Besides making AIs more aligned in general, some 
interventions may help avoid negative outcomes - such 
as suffering outcomes from flawed realization scenarios - 
in particular. Most of the current alignment research 
seeks to ensure that the values of any created AIs are 
aligned with humanity’s values to a maximum possible 
extent, so that the future they create will contain as much 
positive value as possible. This is a difficult goal: to the 
extent that humanity’s values are complex and fragile 
(Yudkowsky 2011), successful alignment may require 
getting a very large amount of details right. 
On the other hand, it seems much easier to give AIs 
goals that merely ensure that they will not create a future 
with negative value by causing suffering outcomes. This 
suggests an approach of fail-safe methods: safety nets or 
mechanisms such that, if AI control fails, the outcome 
will be as good as it gets under the circumstances. Fail-
safe methods could include tasking AI with the objective 
of buying more time to carefully solve goal alignment 
more generally, or fallback goal functions: 
Research fallback goals: Research ways to 
implement multi-layered goal functions, with a “fallback 
goal” that kicks in if the implementation of the top layer 
does not fulfill certain safety criteria. The fallback would 
be a simpler, less ambitious goal that is less likely to 
result in bad outcomes. Difficulties would lie in selecting 
the safety criteria in ways that people with different 
values could all agree on, and in making sure that the 
fallback goal gets triggered under the correct 
circumstances.  
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Care needs to be taken with the selection of the 
fallback goal, however. If the goal was something like 
reducing suffering, then in a multipolar (Bostrom 2014) 
scenario, other superintelligences could have an incentive 
to create large amounts of suffering in order to coerce the 
superintelligence with the fallback goal to act in some 
desired way. 
Research ways to clearly separate superintelligence 
designs from ones that would contribute to suffering risk. 
Yudkowsky (2017) proposes building potential 
superintelligences in such a way as to make them widely 
separated in design space from ones that would cause 
suffering outcomes. For example, if an AI has a 
representation of “what humans value” V which it is 
trying to maximize, then it would only take a small 
(perhaps accidental) change to turn it into one that 
maximized -V instead, possibly causing enormous 
suffering. One proposed way of achieving this is by 
never trying to explicitly represent complete human 
values: then, the AI “just doesn't contain the information 
needed to compute states of the universe that we'd 
consider worse than death; flipping the sign of the utility 
function U, or subtracting components from U and then 
flipping the sign, doesn't identify any state we consider 
worse than [death]” (Yudkowsky 2017). This would also 
reduce the risk of suffering being created through another 
actor which was trying to extort the superintelligence. 
Carry out research on suffering risks and the 
enabling factors of suffering. At this moment, there is 
only little research to the possibility of risks of 
astronomical suffering. Two kinds of research would be 
particularly useful. First, research focused on 
understanding the biological and algorithmic foundation 
of suffering (Metzinger 2016) could help understand how 
likely outcomes such as suffering subroutines would be. 
Pearce (1995) has argued for the possibility of minds 
motivated by “gradients of bliss”, which would not need 
to experience any suffering: if minds could be designed 
in such a manner, that might help avoid suffering 
outcomes. 
Second, research on suffering outcomes in general, 
to understand how to avoid them. With regard to 
suffering risks from extortion scenarios, targeted research 
in economics, game theory or decision theory could be 
particularly valuable.   
Rethink maxipok and maximin. Bostrom (2002, 
2013) proposes a “maxipok rule” to act as a rule of 
thumb when trying to act in the best interest of humanity 
as a whole:  
Maxipok: Maximise the probability of an ‘OK 
outcome’, where an OK outcome is any outcome that 
avoids existential catastrophe. 
The considerations in this paper do not necessarily 
refute the rule as written, especially not since Bostrom 
defines an “existential catastrophe” to include “the 
permanent and drastic destruction of its potential for 
desirable future development”, and the realization of 
suffering outcomes could very well be thought to fall 
under this definition. However, in practice much of the 
discourse around the concept of existential risk has 
focused on the possibility of extinction, so it seems 
valuable to highlight the fact that “existential 
catastrophe” does not include only scenarios of zero 
value, but also scenarios of negative value. 
Bostrom (2002, 2013) also briefly discusses the 
“maximin” principle, "choose the action that has the best 
worst-case outcome", and rejects this principle as he 
argues that this entails “choosing the action that has the 
greatest benefit under the assumption of impending 
extinction. Maximin thus implies that we ought all to 
start partying as if there were no tomorrow.” (Bostrom 
2013, p. 19). However, since a significant contribution to 
the expected value of AI comes from worse outcomes 
than extinction, this argument is incorrect. While there 
may be other reasons to reject maximin, the principle 
correctly implies choosing the kinds of actions that avoid 
the worst suffering outcomes and so might not be very 
dissimilar from maxipok. 
7 Acknowledgments 
David Althaus, Stuart Armstrong, Tobias Baumann, Max 
Daniel, Ruairi Donnelly, and two anonymous reviewers 
provided valuable feedback on this paper. 
8 References 
[1] Alexander, S. (2014). Meditations on Moloch. Slate 
Star Codex. http://slatestarcodex.com/2014/07/30/ 
meditations-on-moloch/ 
[2] Armstrong, S., & Sandberg, A. (2013). Eternity in 
six hours: Intergalactic spreading of intelligent life 
and sharpening the Fermi paradox. Acta 
Astronautica, 89, 1-13.  
[3] Armstrong, S., Bostrom, N., & Shulman, C. (2016). 
Racing to the precipice: a model of artificial 
intelligence development. AI & Society, 31(2), 201-
206.  
[4] Baumeister, R. F., Bratslavsky, E., Finkenauer, C., 
& Vohs, K. D. (2001). Bad is stronger than good. 
Review of General Psychology, 5(4), 323-370.  
[5] Benatar, D. (2008). Better never to have been: the 
harm of coming into existence. Oxford University 
Press.  
[6] Biswas-Diener, R. & Diener, E. (2001). Making the 
best of a bad situation: Satisfaction in the slums of 
Calcutta. Social Indicators Research, 55, 329-352. 
[7] Bostrom, N. (2002). Existential risks: Analyzing 
human extinction scenarios and related hazards. 
Journal of Evolution and Technology, 9(1). 
[8] Bostrom, N. (2003a). Astronomical waste: The 
opportunity cost of delayed technological 
development. Utilitas, 15(3), 308-314.  
[9] Bostrom, N. (2003b). Are we living in a computer 
simulation? The Philosophical Quarterly, 53(211), 
243-255. 
[10] Bostrom, N. (2004). The future of human evolution. 
In Tandy, C. (ed.) Death and anti-death: Two 
hundred years after Kant, fifty years after Turing, 
339-371.  
[11] Bostrom, N. (2013). Existential risk prevention as 
global priority. Global Policy, 4(1), 15-31.  
Superintelligence as a Cause or Cure ... Informatica 41 (2017) 389–400 399 
[12] Bostrom, N. (2014). Superintelligence: Paths, 
dangers, strategies. OUP Oxford.  
[13] Bostrom, N., Dafoe, A., & Flynn, C. (2016). Policy 
Desiderata in the Development of Machine 
Superintelligence. 
https://nickbostrom.com/papers/aipolicy.pdf 
[14] Diamond, J. (1997). Guns, Germs, and Steel: The 
Fates of Human Societies. W. W. Norton. 
[15] Diener, E., Ng, W., Harter, J. & Arora, R. (2010). 
Wealth and Happiness Across the World: Material 
Prosperity Predicts Life Evaluation, Whereas 
Psychosocial Prosperity Predicts Positive Feeling. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
99(1), 52– 61. 
[16] Ditto, P. H., Druley, J. A., Moore, K. A., Danks, J. 
H., & Smucker, W. D. (1996). Fates worse than 
death: the role of valued life activities in health-
state evaluations. Health Psychology, 15(5), 332.  
[17] Dorado, D. (2015). Ethical Interventions in the 
Wild: An Annotated Bibliography. Relations: 
Beyond Anthropocentrism, 3, 219.  
[18] Ellison, H. (1967). I Have No Mouth, and I Must 
Scream. IF: Worlds of Science Fiction, March 
1967. 
[19] Farr, A. D. (1980). Early opposition to obstetric 
anaesthesia. Anaesthesia, 35(9), 896-907.  
[20] Fehige, C. (1998). “A Pareto Principle for Possible 
People” in Fehige, C. & Wessels, U. (eds.) 
Preferences. Berlin: De Gruyter, 509-543.  
[21] Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations. (2012). FAOSTAT Agriculture – 
Livestock Primary Dataset: world total of animals 
slaughtered for meat in 2012. Retrieved January 26, 
2016, from http://faostat.fao.org/site/569/ 
DesktopDefault.aspx?PageID=569 
[22] Flannery, F. (2016). Understanding Apocalyptic 
Terrorism: Countering the Radical Mindset. 
Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. 
[23] Fredrickson, B. L. (1998). What good are positive 
emotions? Review of General Psychology, 2(3), 
300.  
[24] Gentle, M. (2004). Human Waste. In Cartomancy. 
Gollancz. 
[25] Gloor, L. (2016). Suffering-focused AI safety. 




[26] Gloor, L. (2017). Tranquilism. Foundational 
Research Institute. https://foundational-
research.org/tranquilism/ 
[27] Gloor, L. & Mannino, A. (2016). The Case for 
Suffering-Focused Ethics. Foundational Research 
Institute. https://foundational-research.org/the-case-
for-suffering-focused-ethics/ 
[28] Goertzel, B. & Pitt, J.,  (2012). Nine ways to bias 
open-source AGI toward friendliness. Journal of 
Evolution and Technology, 22(1).  
[29] Greaves, H (2017). Population axiology. 
Philosophy Compass, 12:e12442. https://doi.org/ 
10.1111/phc3.12442 
[30] Greene, J. (2013). Moral tribes: Emotion, Reason, 
and the gap between us and them. Penguin.  
[31] Hanson, R. (1998). The Great Filter - Are We 
Almost Past It? 
http://mason.gmu.edu/~rhanson/greatfilter.html 
[32] Hanson, R. (2016). The Age of Em: Work, Love, 
and Life when Robots Rule the Earth. Oxford 
University Press.  
[33] Häggström, O. (2016). Here Be Dragons: Science, 
Technology and the Future of Humanity. Oxford 
University Press.  
[34] Langman, P. (2015). School Shooters: 
Understanding High School, College, and Adult 
Perpetrators. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.  
[35] Le Guin, U. K. (1973). The ones who walk away 
from Omelas. In Silverberg, R. (ed.), New 
Dimensions 3. 
[36] Lukas, R.E., Diener, E. & Suh, E. (1996). 
Discriminant Validity of Well-Being Measures. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
71(3), 616-628. 
[37] Lyubomirsky, S. (2010). 11 Hedonic Adaptation to 
Positive and Negative Experiences. In Folkman, S. 
& Nathan, P.E. (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of 
Stress, Health, and Coping. Oxford University 
Press. 
[38] Manning, P. (1992) The Slave Trade: The Formal 
Demography of a Global System. In Klein, M. A., 
& Hogendorn, J. (eds.) The Atlantic slave trade: 
effects on economies, societies and peoples in 
Africa, the Americas, and Europe. Duke University 
Press.  
[39] Metzinger, T. (2015). What if they need to suffer? 
Edge.org response to: What do you think about 
machines that think? https://www.edge.org/ 
response-detail/26091 
[40] Metzinger, T. (2016). Suffering. In Almqvist, K. & 
Haag, A. (eds.) The Return of Consciousness. 
Stockholm: Axel and Margaret Ax:son Johnson 
Foundation 
[41] Miller, J. D. (2012). Singularity Rising: Surviving 
and thriving in a smarter, richer, and more 
dangerous world. BenBella Books, Inc.  
[42] Muehlhauser, L. (2017). 2017 Report on 




[43] Narveson, J. (1973). Moral problems of population. 
The Monist, 62-86. 
[44] National Research Council’s Committee on 
Recognition and Alleviation of Pain in Laboratory 
Animals. (2009). Recognition and alleviation of 
pain in laboratory animals. Washington (DC): 
National Academies Press .  
[45] Nussbaum, M. (1997) Capabilities and Human 
Rights, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 273. 
[46] Ord, T. (2013). Why I'm Not a Negative Utilitarian. 
http://www.amirrorclear.net/academic/ideas/negativ
e-utilitarianism/ 
400 Informatica 41 (2017) 389–400  K. Sotala et al. 
[47] Parfit, D. (1991). Equality or Priority? (Department 
of Philosophy: University of Kansas)  
[48] Pearce, D. (1995). The Hedonistic Imperative. 
https://www.hedweb.com/hedab.htm 
[49] Persson, I., & Savulescu, J. (2012). Unfit for the 
future: the need for moral enhancement. Oxford 
University Press.  
[50] Rachels, S (1998). Counterexamples to the 
transitivity of better than. Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy, 76(1):71-83. 
[51] Regan, T (1980). Utilitarianism, Vegetarianism, and 
Animal Rights. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
9(4):305-324. 
[52] Rubin, E. B., Buehler, A. E., & Halpern, S. D. 
(2016). States worse than death among hospitalized 
patients with serious illnesses. JAMA Internal 
Medicine, 176(10), 1557-1559.  
[53] Ryding, D. (no date). Yes, Jolonah, There Is A Hell. 
Orion's Arm. http://www.orionsarm.com/page/233 
[54] Sayah, F. A., Mladenovic, A., Gaebel, K., Xie, F., 
& Johnson, J. A. (2015). How dead is dead? 
Qualitative findings from participants of combined 
traditional and lead-time time trade-off valuations. 
Quality of Life Research, 25(1), 35-43. 
[55] Shulman, C. (2012). Are pain and pleasure equally 
energy-efficient? *Reflective Disequilibrium*. 
https://reflectivedisequilibrium.blogspot.fi/2012/03/
are-pain-and-pleasure-equally-energy.html 
[56] Shulman, C., & Armstrong, S. (2009). Arms control 
and intelligence explosions. In 7th European 
Conference on Computing and Philosophy (ECAP), 
Bellaterra, Spain, July (pp. 2-4).  
[57] Singer, P. (1981/2011). The Expanding Circle: 
Ethics, Evolution, and Moral Progress. Princeton 
University Press.  
[58] Singer, P. (1993). Practical Ethics, second edition. 
Cambridge University Press.  
[59] Soares, N., & Fallenstein, B. (2017). Agent 
Foundations for Aligning Machine Intelligence with 
Human Interests: A Technical Research Agenda. In 
Callaghan et al. (eds.) The Technological 
Singularity - Managing the Journey (pp. 103-125). 
Springer Berlin Heidelberg.  
[60] Soares, N. (2016). The Value Learning Problem. 
2nd International Workshop on AI and Ethics, 
AAAI-2016. Phoenix, Arizona. 
[61] Sotala, K., & Yampolskiy, R. V. (2015). Responses 
to Catastrophic AGI Risk: A Survey. Physica 
Scripta, 90(1), 018001.  
[62] Sotala, K. (2016). Defining Human Values for 
Value Learners. 2nd International Workshop on AI 
and Ethics, AAAI-2016. Phoenix, Arizona. 
[63] Tomasik, B. (2015). The importance of wild-animal 
suffering. Relations: Beyond Anthropocentrism, 3, 
133.  
[64] Tomasik, B. (2017). What Are Suffering 
Subroutines? http://reducing-suffering.org/what-
are-suffering-subroutines/ 
[65] Torres, P. (2016).Agential Risks: A Comprehensive 
Introduction. Journal of Evolution and Technology, 
26(2), pp. 31-47. 
[66] Torres, P. (2017a). Who Would Destroy the World? 
Omnicidal Agents and Related Phenomena. Pre-
publication draft: https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/ 
d9aaad_b18ce62c32be44ddbf64268fc295fdc0.pdf 
[67] Torres, P. (2017b). Morality, Foresight, and Human 
Flourishing: An Introduction to Existential Risks. 
Durham, North Carolina: Pitchstone Publishing. 
[68] West, B. (2017). An Argument for Why the Future 
May Be Good. Effective Altruism Forum, 
http://effective-altruism.com/ea/1cl/ 
an_argument_for_why_the_future_may_be_good/. 
[69] World Food Programme. (2017). Zero Hunger. 
http://www1.wfp.org/zero-hunger  
[70] Yudkowsky, E. (2004). Coherent extrapolated 
volition. Singularity Institute for Artificial 
Intelligence. https://intelligence.org/files/CEV.pdf 
[71] Yudkowsky, E. (2008). Artificial intelligence as a 
positive and negative factor in global risk. In 
Bostrom, N. & Ćirković, M.M. (eds.) Global 
Catastrophic Risks. New York: Oxford University 
Press.  
[72] Yudkowsky, E. (2009). Failed Utopia #4-2. Less 
Wrong. 
http://lesswrong.com/lw/xu/failed_utopia_42/ 
[73] Yudkowsky, E. (2011). Complex Value Systems are 
Required to Realize Valuable Futures. 
Machine Intelligence Research Institute. 
https://intelligence.org/files/ComplexValues.pdf 
[74] Yudkowsky, E. (2017). Separation from 
hyperexistential risk. Arbital. Retrieved December 
11, 2017, from https://arbital.com/p/ 
hyperexistential_separation/  
[75] Zaneveld, J. R., McMinds, R., & Vega, T. R. 
(2017). Stress and stability: applying the Anna 
Karenina principle to animal microbiomes. Nature 
Microbiology, 2, 17121.  
 
